Stadien der kindlichen Entwicklung nach Piaget Piaget's theory of cognitive development

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Synonyme

Stadien der kindlichen Entwicklung nach Piaget, Piaget's theory of cognitive development

Bemerkungen

Weit verbreitet sind noch immer die wissenschaftlich längst widerlegten Annahmen aus Piagets Theorie, denen zufolge das Denken von Kindern zwischen 4 und 8 Jahren auf das Konkrete beschränkt sei.

Von Henrik Saalbach, Miriam Leuchter, Elsbeth Stern im Buch Didaktik für die ersten Bildungsjahre (2010) im Text Entwicklungspsychologische Grundlagen der Didaktik für die ersten Bildungsjahre

Over the past several decades, however—and with the development of new methods for assessing the cognitive abilities of infants and young children— considerable research has suggested that Piaget underestimated the causal reasoning abilities of young children. Both infants and adults seem to perceive causality when objects (like billiard balls) collide and launch one another (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Michotte, 1962; Oakes & Cohen, 1990). Infants also seem to expect causal constraints on object motion, assuming that objects respect principles of support, containment, cohesion, continuity, and contact (Baillargeon, Kotovsky, & Needham, 1995; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Spelke, Katz, Purcell, Ehrlich, & Breinlinger, 1994).

Von Alison Gopnik, ‎Laura Schulz im Buch Causal Learning (2007) im Text Introduction

Wenn ich Kritik an Piagets Entwicklungstheorie sowie insbesondere an deren Rezeption übe, dann stelle ich nicht die empirischen Befunde in Frage. Die häufig vorgebrachte Kritik an Piagets Werk, seine empirische Basis beschränke sich auf seine drei Kinder, trifft gerade nicht den Kern. Piagets Aufgaben waren genial, und die von ihm gefundenen Antworten lassen sich noch immer an Kindern in unterschiedlichen Kulturkreisen reproduzieren. Allerdings gibt es inzwischen zahlreiche Befunde, die zeigen, dass Piaget die geistige Leistung der Kinder unterschätzte, weil er Antworten der Kinder, die mit dem Kontext seiner Aufgabenstellung zu tun hatten, übergeneralisierte. Die Einbeziehung zusätzlicher Beobachtungsdaten) geringfügige Abweichungen in der Aufgabenstellung oder recht einfache Formen der Unterstützung zeigen, dass Kinder mehr von der Welt begreifen, als angenommen wurde.

Von Elsbeth Stern im Text Lernen - der wichtigste Hebel der geistigen Entwicklung (2003)

Moreover, contra Piaget, considerable evidence suggests that even babies appropriately distinguish psychological and physical causality. Specifically, infants seem to interpret human, but not mechanical, action as goal directed and self-initiated (Meltzoff, 1995; A. L. Woodward, 1998; A. L. Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). Thus, for instance, babies expect physical objects to move through contact (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes & Cohen, 1990) but do not expect the same of human agents (A. L. Woodward et al., 1993); expect that an object will be entrained when grasped by a human hand but not by an inanimate object (Leslie, 1982, 1984); and treat the reach of a human hand, but not the trajectory of a metal claw, as goal directed (A. L. Woodward, 1998). Furthermore, almost as soon as children can speak they offer causal explanations (at least of familiar, everyday events) that respect domain boundaries (Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Finally, preschoolers’ predictions, causal judgments, and counterfactual inferences are remarkably accurate across a wide range of tasks and content areas (e.g., Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Kalish, 1996; Sobel, 2004).

Von Alison Gopnik, ‎Laura Schulz im Buch Causal Learning (2007) im Text Introduction

Piaget’s theory relies on two erroneous assumptions. Firstly that children’s thinking is relatively stable at each stage of development, but then undergoes a radical shift, before stabilising again until the next developmental stage is reached. The second is that the developmental state affects all tasks and abilities consistently. More recent research on cognitive development has supplanted stage theory accounts of cognitive development. We now know that infants have been found to have early, possibly native, competencies in certain domains. For example, very young children seem to show an almost innate knowledge of principles related to the physical world, biological causality, numbers and morality. As we discussed in Chapter 1, David Geary says these are part of ‘biologically primary culture’ – aspects of culture which are rapidly and effortlessly learnt because they granted advantages in our evolutionary past and so we have evolved to easily learn them. Futhermore, cognitive development looks more continuous and gradual than stage-like, and the way children perform cognitive tasks varies considerably. Children will not only perform different tasks in different ways, they may go about the same task in two different ways on successive days. This is supported by Siegler’s ‘overlapping waves’ theory of development (see Chapter 2). Certainly children change as they age, but context matters: what children may think, believe or be able to do in one context, they may not be able to replicate in another.